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VIEWS:
NEWMAN'S PANDEMICS
Pandemic Revisited
[Sep 6 07]
The great flu pandemic of 2007
hasn’t happened yet. But don’t go away! The pandemic flu knows no
seasons, and isn’t a once-a-year event. Bird flu is spreading –
mostly among birds so far, and in many places. What we don’t know
about it would fill volumes: we never know enough beforehand. That
seems to be a law of nature. Grim scenarios might still happen.
I wrote: “Ethics and Triage – A Nasty Scenario” a few months ago,
suggesting that even with the best of pandemic planning, our health
care systems might become overwhelmed if one or more of the basic
assumptions proves too optimistic. I received feedback suggesting
that our propensity to go into ‘feeding’ frenzies when confronted
with real or anticipated scarcities of anything – such as
popularized toys or almost anything else – makes it inevitable that
the ‘nasty’ scenarios, including riots and mayhem, are highly
likely. In other words, the breakdown of civilized norms will surely
accompany pandemic. My good friend Thomas Hobbes has described life
in such circumstances as “nasty, brutish, and short.”
Such frenzies could happen, and might happen here and there.
However, the records of what happened in the London Plague of
1664-65 and what has happened since in times of war, pandemic, and
disasters both natural and deliberate, including ice-storms, floods,
hurricanes, earthquakes and tornados, suggest that we humans are
amazingly resilient and will as a rule help each other. The folks
who make up the ‘grass-roots’ in our communities, though usually
ignored by the planners, are our great strength.
Planning can help. Preparation, including training and education,
can help greatly. First Responders are mightily needed. Central
governments can play a key role in organizing supplies and
logistics, and bringing in emergency legislation such as
quarantines. But as we have seen time and again, it’s the folks on
the ground where and when ‘it’ happens, who must do the coping.
The professionals can seldom get to the scene (or many scenes
simultaneously) immediately. Sometimes it can take hours, days, and
even weeks to get through the debris. Too often, the jurisdictional
barriers are worse than the physical ones. Until the professionals
arrive, people suffer and die without recourse other than helping
themselves, and helping those around them. Sometimes, as in a
pandemic, too many will suffer and die; regardless of what we do.
But we must do what we can while we can.
The more distant the authority, the longer the delay: the more
immediate to the disaster, the quicker the response. Centralization
has no place in disaster first response. Its main utility is in
churning out press releases justifying its existence.
We organize for disasters ass-forward and upside down.
Danger Pay
[Aug 27 07]
Back when SARS threatened
Toronto, the Ontario government of the day introduced strict
quarantine measures reminiscent of the often drastic quarantine laws
applied in times of plague -- [as in London 1664-65].
Quarantines are difficult to
enforce, but the quarantine worked for Toronto and SARS was
contained. But, as can happen when something new attacks in epidemic
proportions, people died and some of them were healthcare workers.
They died in part because we
didn't know enough -- we never do -- and in part because people wore
the wrong masks, or they weren't properly fitted, and because the
hospital culture took a while to get over an under-estimation of the
dangers. We will be ready for SARS next time, but next time it won't
be SARS, and there will be casualties.
One outcome of the re-hash of the
SARS experience is a call for danger pay -- looking ahead to an
anticipated pandemic. Undoubtedly healthcare workers will face risks
and uncertainties; some will be casualties and some will die. It's
not enough to say that it goes with the territory and the
Hippocratic Oath -- I'm not sure it does when it comes to the
crunch.
In the exceptionally virulent
plague outbreak in London [1664-65], many of the best doctors and
nurses died in the first weeks, as they worked valiantly and
desperately to help the sufferers. This was not the dark ages;
London was a capitol of enlightenment, home to many men and women of
science and medicine. But when the plague came, in a particularly
horrific form, they didn't know enough. Regardless of how advanced
we think we are today, the same truth holds -- we never know enough,
and too often, the best among us die trying to stem the tide.
Danger pay or compensation or
insurance may well be justified. But think about it: pandemic is
just one form of disaster affecting the many, and the response to
disaster involves the many. There are many unsung heroes. There are
many who suffer, and too many who die. Pandemics, like disasters in
general, do not differentiate between the professionals and the rest
of us. Doctors and nurses, and orderlies, and many other healthcare
workers, are on the firing line. But so too are the paramedics,
firefighter first responders and a host of others including
volunteers. And then there are the collectors of the dead, and the
ones who dig the pits and dispose of the corpses. How about the
folks trying to maintain law and order while the world around panics
and goes ballistic? And finally, there is the largest category of
them all: you, me, and everyone else; the patients and the potential
victims. We are all in it together, so where does danger 'pay' begin
and end, and with whom?
A few callous souls have argued
that if 'we' don't get danger pay 'we' will simply down tools and
refuse to show up at work; the 'we' variously referring to doctors
and other healthcare workers. It's an interesting argument.
Fortunately, there is a precedent --
A few years ago, emergency room
doctors in Winnipeg walked out. They claimed, likely justifiably,
that they were overloaded, the system was breaking down, and no one
cared. So they downed tools and the entire emergency system shut
down. I think the walkout lasted for two weeks or thereabouts. The
mortality rate in Winnipeg dropped alarmingly; of the order of 30
percent. In due course, the emergency people returned to work.
But one seems to have absorbed
the underlying issue: if there were no healthcare system, would we
be worse off or better off? What would happen if all the patients
downed tools and walked out? How would the politicians cope with a
pandemic of angry voters? Let them try to quarantine that!
Remember Bob: "You have the
power." So vote as you like, but vote often.
Ethics and Triage: A Nasty Scenario
[Dec 12 06]
If only the rich could pay the poor to die instead of them, Then the
poor would make a very good living. (Ancient Yiddish Joke)
A Flu Pandemic has begun. The hospitals are crowded. Staff is
overworked: many have come down with the flu – one sort or another.
The ‘normal’ flu doesn’t vanish just because of a pandemic. Even
before the flu's came, the usual ailments and conditions have just
about taxed the limits of the system’s capacities; and the pandemic
is a long way from peaking.
It’s bitter cold outside. People, old and young, are dragging
themselves, or loved ones, or neighbors, to Family Practice offices,
and to hospital Emergencies. Taxis refuse to take them – this stuff
is dangerous! – public transit is barely operating: drivers are
sick, or calling in sick and maintenance is non-existent. Who would
want to ride the bus and breathe in undiluted virus? So people
drive, or walk, or stumble, or are wheeled to their local version of
purgatory.
The paramedics and first-response people, like many doctors, nurses,
and orderlies, have, in some cases, literally worked themselves to
death. Others are genuinely seriously ill at home. In any case,
hospitals won’t allow ambulances to unload: the situation has become
too serious for ambulances: they are irrelevant against the scale of
the emergency. This puts the First Responders in a Catch-22 bind:
what are they supposed to do with the living, the dying, and the
corpses? The fire-paramedic and police stations have become hospital
wards, and mortuaries.
Family Practice offices are crowded; there weren’t enough to begin
with, and now more and more are closed – the doctors and nurse
practitioners have strived valiantly for weeks, working round the
clock; but many have succumbed to the illness and are too sick to
carry on. Some have already died. The sufferers keep arriving – and
are told to go to “Emergency.”
The Emergency is so crowded it’s impossible to move: too few staff,
too few Triage Officers’, too many forms and too few to fill them
in. More tests needed? – long waits; supplies dwindling.
It’s not just in “Emergency” – the corridors are lined with sick and
dying. The ‘lucky’ ones have beds; others are wrapped in blankets on
the floor. The sound of coughing, hacking, groans rasps and rattles
adds to the background. The place doesn’t smell- it reeks.
The only ones around to help are family and volunteers; but they too
are a dying breed.
The kitchens have shut down. The Tim Hortons a few blocks away is
the main source of hot soup and beverages.
The chaos extends outside the hospital. Every few minutes a car
pulls up to the curb and someone terribly sick is pushed out or
loaded into a wheelchair; and then abandoned. People are desperate.
People don’t want to watch loved ones die. They want to get them to
where help is available, but there is no more room at the inn.
There’s no room and the authorities have instituted a quarantine.
There are fierce barriers to admission - -even to approaching the
hospital. Police and Military, guns evident, are supposed to enforce
the ban, but they didn’t sign up to turn away the sick and dying to
perish of exposure on the street; at the very gates of supposed aid
and comfort. They try to keep a semblance of order: lining up the
wheelchairs – many with their frozen dead occupants -- in neat rows.
Some are in tears; none will ever be free again in their minds. This
is not a job: this is hell.
Worse yet are the ones who have lost it, watching their loved ones
going downhill with no access and no hope. Some arrive in a rage,
screaming threats, demanding access -- armed and very dangerous. Are
they to be gunned down on the spot? Is there time, patience, and
skills to talk them into calm? Can it be done?
Pharmacists (legitimately part of the Front Line) are also besieged
as people line up to request, demand, and plead for something –
anything – to help their loved ones. They are worked off their feet
doing what they can, but they are hampered by government
irresolution in deciding what powers pharmacists should have. It
would have been an enormous assist to everyone if government had
given them emergency powers to prescribe and dispense on the spot;
and if government had also picked up the tab for all
pandemic-related drugs. Some go ahead and prescribe anyhow; but
supplies are dwindling.
As in all pandemics, even in our supposedly enlightened age, the
miracle-workers with trumped up testimonials from the crowned heads
of Europe, quacks with nostrums, and ‘end is nigh’ callers to
repentance all have their moments of glory -- and riches: its
remarkable how expensive the goods and services are which these
selfless folks ‘freely’ offer. Human nature is eternal in its often
excellent ways -- and in its folly.
At the other end of the chain, the mortality rate among those
admitted to hospital is much higher than predicted: in part because
the virus is especially virulent; in part because the system has
broken down; and in part because all attempts to establish interior
quarantines (cohorting) have been defeated by increasingly
over-worked staff, and a shared air-circulation system. The usual
crop of hospital-specific infections is proliferating.
There are no more resources left and little chance of getting any
anytime soon: suppliers and distributors are at their limits and
manufacturers are forced to ration dwindling output.
The hospital mortuaries are full. Autopsies will have to come later
-- much later; if at all. Meanwhile, bodies, neatly toe-tagged, are
stacked like firewood in a more-or-less exterior courtyard. The
weather is cold enough: they will wait there quietly. Anyhow,
morticians have closed up shop for the duration. Those with the
courage and strength retrieve their dead and go to join the long
lines at the crematoria.
The death rate is also high among the thousands cleared out from the
hospitals to make room for the pandemic flu sufferers: sent home, or
to long-term care facilities, or otherwise moved out of sight and
out of mind. They live, or die, or will be debilitated for the rest
of their lives.
Scalpers are thriving: they don’t mind the cold as they wait
patiently on the streets around the hospitals for new arrivals. The
going rate for an admission for one is $25,000 (up front in cash).
There are enough takers to make the middle-men wealthy, and to
handsomely reward the good folks inside who are ready to pocket the
bribes. Being a triage officer, or a key person in the paperwork
chain, is a license to print money.
Anyhow, a disproportionate number of highly placed bureaucrats and
politicians, and their friends, family, and lovers, seem to get
rooms and beds and ventilators, and the world’s gone mad around you,
so why not get some benefit? After all, you’re one of the few still
on the job, taking the big risk with your life, so why not?
There are still some who are trying hard to stay ethical – to do the
right thing because it’s in their nature. But it is hard; because so
much has gone wrong and it’s not a matter of pointing blame. It
doesn’t mean the Plan was flawed. It doesn’t mean that society, and
the system, were at fault. There may have been flaws and errors, but
that’s only because we are human and frail and mortal and come with
the full set of emotions. This emergency is overwhelming – like a
millennium storm it has surged through our cities and buried our
best plans and hopes in an abyss of tragedy. (It happens).
PostScript
Worst Case scenarios seldom happen: by definition, they are
unlikely. But when they do happen, they tend to be much worse than
anyone could imagine.
I wrote this scenario to try to answer a lurking question: are
Ethics and Triage at all compatible? Worst Case scenarios test the
limits and when I think about what could happen at the limit, I
don’t at this point see any room for Ethics (or Morality) in a
Triage situation --- unless, and this may be key – the Ethics are
built in to the Triage Design.
However, stating a set of lofty humanitarian principles up front is
not the same as ensuring they are followed in the field. With the
best will in the world, Triage has to be based on other principles –
such as making the most effective use of limited resources, and the
greatest good for the most.
Fairness is a worthy test of a system – in the sense that Triage and
what follows must not be arbitrary, and should be equitable (without
fear or favor). In the main, that is feasible – though there will
always be queue-jumpers. But Fairness has little to do with
Compassion.
Hard choices -- sometimes the trade-offs are wrenching, at best.
I’ll try to work some more with these issues. Your views, in the
light of your own experiences, would help.
Be well.
Pandemic Flu Planning: "A Flow is a
Quantification of Assumptions"
[Dec 6 06]--References.
I have made use of three references: 1] Government of Ontario Flu
Pandemic Plan, Chapter 17 Acute Care Services & 17a: Tools; 2]
Shoppers Drug Mart Healthwatch Pamphlet: Flu; and 3] Government of
Ontario Pamphlet, “What you should know about a flu
pandemic.” April 2006.
My own comments are
enclosed in brackets [like so].
Flu and Pandemic Flu
Facts
FLU
Flu is caused by influenza A and B viruses.
It is spread mainly by virus in the air.
It finds a comfortable home
in your airways.
It starts to be contagious 1 day before you first
experience symptoms and remains contagious for at least 5 days after
symptoms start.
Flu can lead to serious
complications: pneumonia, bronchitis, sinus infections, ear infections,
dehydration, and in very serious situations, death.
Ordinary flu happens every year:
usually from November to April – and then stops.
Pandemic flu usually comes in two
or three waves several months apart. Each wave lasts 2 -3 months.
5%-20% of the population may get
the flu in any given year.
A yearly flu shot reduces risk of
catching flu by 70-90%.
PANDEMIC FLU
A pandemic is distinguished by
its scope: it is a worldwide epidemic.
A pandemic flu strain often
develops when an animal or bird virus mixes with a human virus to form a new
virus. Because people have little or no immunity, the disease can spread
faster than with an ordinary flu.
The symptoms are the same as with
an ordinary flu but can be much more severe.
There were three flu pandemics in
the 20th century: the most deadly, the “Spanish Flu” in 1918-19 killed
20,000,000.The death rate was highest among healthy adults in their 20’s and
30’s. [The Median Age of Ontarians is 37].
A flu pandemic could happen any
time.
We can’t predict just how society
will be affected until we learn how strong the virus is.
There is no existing vaccine for
pandemic flu. It will take 4-5 months after the start of the pandemic to
develop a vaccine.
Drugs used to treat ordinary flu may also
help people with pandemic flu but we may not have a large enough supply, and
we won’t know how effective they are until the virus is identified.
ASSUMPTIONS
[“A
‘FLOW’ IS A QUANTIFICATION OF ASSUMPTIONS”]
Based on CDC’s U.S. FluSurge
Forecasting model and an assumed 35% Influenza Attack Rate --
Over an eight week pandemic:
[there might be 3 such waves in a pandemic year]
Admissions:
|
Wk 1 |
Wk 2 |
Wk 3 |
Wk 4 |
Wk 5 |
Wk 6 |
Wk 7 |
Wk 8 |
|
3675 |
6125 |
9188 |
11638 |
11638 |
9188 |
6125 |
3675 |
Peak admissions/day: 1814
Deaths:
|
Wk 1 |
Wk 2 |
Wk 3 |
Wk 4 |
Wk 5 |
Wk 6 |
Wk 7 |
Wk 8 |
|
726 |
1209 |
1814 |
2298 |
2298 |
1814 |
1209 |
726 |
If you live in Ontario: during the
first wave --
You have 1 chance in 3 of catching
the pandemic flu
If you catch it, you have 1 chance
in 2 of needing to visit your family doctor
and 1 chance in 70 of needing to
be hospitalized
If you need to be hospitalized,
you have 1 chance in 5 of dying there.
An unknown proportion of the
population will develop health complications.
These levels are
at least six times greater than typical hospitalizations for influenza and
pneumonia during inter-pandemic periods.
[If you don’t get
the pandemic flu in the first wave, your odds improve greatly:
*improved natural immunity from
the 1st wave experience
*probable availability of a
pandemic flu vaccine
*much better understanding of how
to deal with the virus]
Resources needed by
Hospitalized Influenza Patients:
100% using an acute bed for
5 days
15% using ICU beds for 10 days
7.5% using ventilator support for 10 days
If the Assumptions hold:
At the peak of the pandemic,
influenza patients will use:
52% of all Acute Care Beds
170% of ICU Beds
117% of Ventilator-supported Beds
Current Demand for hospital
services is already high: ICU Beds are utilized 90% daily.
The FluSurge model does not take
into account Health Care Worker absenteeism but the Plan assumes that staff
will contract influenza at the same rate as the general population in their
communities. [History suggests staff will come down with pandemic flu at a
much higher rate, and fatalities will be disproportionately high --
especially in the first weeks. If so, the net effect will be to seriously
reduce availability of trained staff as the pandemic goes on: the impact
will be particularly grave should a second wave and then a third wave hit]
[The Model does not consider how
patients will be moved to and from hospitals: Ontario is a big province with
a population of 12 million (5 million households). However, Ontario is 80%
urban, and most live in the so-called “Golden Horseshoe – from Oshawa to
Niagara, including the Greater Toronto Region].
DEVELOPING HOSPITAL
SURGE CAPACITY
There
has to be a Phased Approach:
*Deferring non-influenza care
*Dynamic use of influenza Triage
*Dynamic Use of Admission/Discharge Criteria
These will vary according to
available and needed local hospital resources.
Specifically --
*Defer Services for Non-Life-Threatening patients.
*Discharge ALC (Alternative Level of Care) patients to
Long-Term Care.
*Discharge acute patients and inpatients to home care.
*Create “flex-beds” from reserved or recently closed
beds.
*Deploy freed-up beds for influenza patients.
*Use Ventilator Capacity anywhere sufficient oxygen is
available:
ER, post-anesthetic care units.
*Cohort infectious and non-infectious patients.
Re-deploy staff.
*Defer holidays and leaves of absence.
*Establish 12 hour shifts.
*Train non-clinical staff to handle support services:
meals, personal care, patient movement, cleaning, etc. and support for
health care workers and families (child care, pet care, etc)
*Coordinate with other hospitals.
*Encourage participation of public in Home Health Care
courses before the pandemic.
*Cross-train clinical staff.
[Wait until the Pandemic strikes.
Then count backward 1 year, and initiate training].
MASS EMERGENCY CARE
DECLARATION
AND CRITICAL CARE
TRIAGE
With
the assumed 35% Attack Rate the phased development of Surge Capacity will
not be enough to meet the Peak Demand. Accordingly, a Mass Emergency Care
condition will have to be declared: this will have “substantial legal,
regulatory, and logistical implications.”
The type of Triage contemplated
is only justifiable in an Overwhelming Crisis i.e. when all resources
are in danger of being exhausted.
Principles
*All
patients will be cared for – one way or another. [True, but not very
comforting.]
*Triage is a practical
application of Ethics [Everything is.]
*Fairness and Justice will
prevail. [How about Compassion?]
*Based on Clear and Transparent
Criteria.
Timely Accurate
Information is vital
Health Care
providers will need real-time data about patient outcomes during a disaster;
in order to modify criteria and prevent over- or under-triage. The Protocol
will evolve with time and use.
Triage Models
No
Triage systems have been developed yet for use in critical care or medical
illnesses but there are models available to draw on:
Illness Severity Scoring
Systems: “cumbersome and impractical during a disaster when human
resources are scarce.”
Military Triage Systems:
“devised specifically for Trauma and not for medical conditions or
biological events.”
SEIRV Triage System:
“developed for use in Bio-Terrorism attacks.”
Categorizes patients but does not
address Resource Allocation.
Uses ‘Inclusion’, ‘Exclusion’,
and ‘Minimum Qualifications for Survival (MQS)’, to guide triage decisions –
“which should be part of all Critical Care Triage Systems.”
Sequential Organ Failure
Assessment Score (SOFA): “may be useful as a component of a Triage
System.” It uses general physiologic parameters applicable in a wide variety
of conditions.
Inclusion
Criteria
Identifies patients who may
benefit from admission to critical care: focusing primarily on respiratory
failure.
Exclusion Criteria
Identifies
those
needing a level of resources which cannot be met in a pandemic, and even if
ICU resources were found they would have a very poor chance of survival
(SOFA Score of > 11 i.e. mortality rate of > 90% even with full critical
care). For example --
*Severe burns
*Cardiac Arrest not responding to prompt
defibrillation or cardiac pacing .
*Needing large blood transfusions
*Underlying “significant and advanced” illnesses with
poor prognosis and high short-term mortality (as in advanced cancer and
end-stage organ failure)
MQS -- Minimum
Qualifications for Survival
Principles
*Place a ceiling on the amount of resources that will
be allocated to any one individual.
*Early identification of patients who are not
improving and are likely to have a poor outcome.
In other words -- find a
‘balance’ between those who are sick enough to need the resource and will do
poorly if they don’t get it, but are not so sick that they are unlikely to
recover even if they do receive intensive care. In other words, every
patient who is admitted to critical care should survive. [And those not
admitted will surely die? Self-fulfilling prophecy.]
OPERATIONALIZING
CRITICAL CARE TRIAGE
“Effective Triage depends on an established, skilled, and practiced
infrastructure.”
CENTRAL TRIAGE COMMITTEE
This is a Multi-disciplinary
Team:
*Making clear and transparent decisions with support
from ethical and legal experts.
*Using consistent Criteria flexible enough to allow
local responses.
*Primarily responsible for:
-- Modifying the Protocol as the pandemic evolves –
based on analysis of
[as it happens] data
-- Command and Control over the critical care
resources in the field.
-- The key decision – when to activate the Protocol.
“These issues are too important
to be decided by the individual Triage Officers in the field.”
TRIAGE OFFICERS
“The best triage decisions are
made by senior physicians with training in triage and significant clinical
experience.”
They must be given proper
training beforehand, as well as on-going support during a pandemic.
COMMUNICATIONS
The quality of decisions by the
Committee and by Triage Officers depends on the availability of accurate
[up-to-date and sufficient] information. There has to be a reliable two-way
Communications Network between the Field and the Committee.
[Given the current lack of
effective communications and a near-total absence of reporting of
system-critical information in all aspects of health care, it’s hard to
believe that the Plan – which results from considerable research, intellect,
and experience – will work as stated: but it is a very good start.]
POST-SCRIPT
On Tuesday,
November 21, 2006, The Hamilton Spectator headline read:
“No pandemic
care for elderly” as the page 1 lead-in to an
article by Joanna Frketich.
On page 8 of the same issue, an article by
Peter Van Harten was headed”
“Pandemic rules
hard to swallow?” with the sub-head
“MD
predicts major ethical debate.”
I’m amazed there weren’t more
such headlines, but it takes a certain amount of effort to locate and then
read such things as pandemic plans, and supreme court decisions.
Does one have to be able to read
as a criterion for attending journalism school? Evidently the Spectator
people can, and do. I wonder about some of the others.
The debate over ethics will
surely take place – if not before the pandemic, then after. As with all
disasters -- natural and non-natural – the political propensity to re-hash
will once again raise its very ugly head.
One element (among many) in the
Draft Triage Protocol Exclusion from Admission criteria set is Age > 85. So
Seniors might be well advised to hide their birth certificates and lie about
their age.
Triage is never easy. If a
pandemic comes upon us the hard choices could become very hard. “Tennis
anyone?”
Be well.
The London Plague of 1664-65: Summary
[from a 2006 columnn]
Foreword
The following account is based on Daniel Defoe’s famous “A Journal
of the Plague Year.” He wrote it in 1722 -- the result of interviews
with survivors and extensive research into parish records, brought
together by a remarkable novelist and investigative reporter (in the
true sense).
The Arrival of the Plague
The plague had visited 60 years before, and a few times each century
for centuries before that, but with the exception of the terrible
“Black Plague” of the 13th century, each visitation was no worse
than those of the other scourges – flu, smallpox, and starvation.
There was no reason to expect anything different.
When the plague reached London it wasn’t a surprise; it had been
reported in Amsterdam and elsewhere on the Continent. It moved
slowly from town to town.
There were 3 plague deaths from late December 1664 through January
1665; they were all in the same house where visitors from the
‘Continent’ were staying. A fourth death was registered in early
February: this time in another house in the same parish.
The winter was long and bitter cold and this seemed to inhibit the
infection. Then it turned warmer: more cases were reported, but not
in epidemic proportions, and confined to one part of town. But the
reports were incomplete and it soon became evident that the plague
had spread “beyond all hopes of abatement.”
When do you know that you face an epidemic: at the first death? when
the trend is clear? And when do you know for sure what illness
people are dying from?
London had a population of 500,000 in 1664. It was home to many
illustrious scientists and physicians. But when the plague came what
was known was not enough. “Where lay the seeds of the infection? How
come it emerged when and where it did?” Why did the plague never
again return in such a virulent form?
The plague came in bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic variants.
Symptoms were not always evident: many didn’t know they were
infected for several days; they continued to move freely and spread
the disease “till the inward gangrene affected their vitals and they
died in a few moments” nor could the cause of death be known for
certain until an autopsy was performed.
When should ‘The Authorities’ let the public know? To declare an
emergency might cause panic and disruption; not to speak out might
doom many who might heed the warnings and take precautions.
Fear and rumour compounded the risks. Quacks came from all parts to
sell their nostrums at exorbitant prices. None of them worked; by
the end the quacks had fled or were dead.
It seemed all regulations, precautions and remedies were useless.
Abandoning hope, many went out and gathered freely, as if there was
no infection. The plague spread faster.
The plague killed nearly everyone there was to kill in the infected
parishes. At least 100,000 died. “Whole streets of families were
swept away together.” It finally self-destructed like a fire that
had consumed all its fuel.
WHAT YOU CAN DO WHEN YOU DON’T KNOW ENOUGH
Decentralize your “Assets”
“Let not such a contagion as this, which is chiefly dangerous to
collected bodies of people, find a million of people in a body
together. The plague, like a great fire, if a few houses only are
contiguous where it happens, can only burn a few houses. But if it
begins in a close-built town, and gets a head, there its fury
increases: it rages over the whole place.”
Run for your Life
Get out of town early. The wealthy and those who could afford it
left town. This exodus continued through May and June; spurred by
rumors that the government was about to set up barricades on the
roads. Without a Pass and a Certificate of Health “there was no way
to being admitted to pass through the towns upon the road, or to
lodge in any inn.”
Many of the poor, out of work and desperate, fled to the
countryside. Many were not sick, but having no place to go, were
forced to wander until they died of exposure and malnutrition, or
from the disease.
“Country folk would carry out food and place it at a distance. When
the wanderers died, the people would dig a hole to windward, and
drag the bodies into these pits with long poles, and cover them.”
The Lord Mayor and other officials stayed at their posts. They used
the City treasury to help sustain the poor. By order of the Lord
Mayor, even at the height of the plague, bread and other basics were
made readily available and price-gouging was forbidden. .
Avoid Contact
To quote an old maxim: “Shun it as if it were The Plague!”
Some families stockpiled food and other essentials and shut
themselves in for the duration: keeping their houses “like little
garrisons and suffering none to go in or come near them.”
[Reminiscent of the early 1960’s nuclear attack panic -- bomb
shelters in backyards, taking to the back woods, gun in hand to fend
off neighbors.]
But in many households, someone had to venture forth to shop for
food and other necessities, and inevitably came into proximity with
others on the street and in shops, and brought the infection back
into the home.
[Conventional disaster planning suggests keeping 72 hours of food
and water on hand. In the event of a pandemic, 6 months of supplies
would be a minimum!]
Destroy the (presumed) Carriers of the Infection
Not knowing by what agency the plague was communicated, they did
what seemed reasonable: “We were ordered to kill all the dogs, cats,
mice, and rats: for they are apt to run from house to house and
might carry the infection in their fur.” [With Avian Flu, should we
slay all the birds too?]
[The irony of killing off the cats and dogs was that they were the
main anti-rat weapon, and it was the virus carried by the fleas on
brown rats that carried the plague; but no one knew that at the
time. Still, fleas do transfer to other carriers, and cats and dogs
might have carried the disease that way.]
Get the Facts: Inspect and Verify
If anyone in a house had plague symptoms or fell dangerously ill
without apparent cause of some other disease, the head of the
household had to notify the authorities within two hours. But given
what would happen to one’s household if one did report (see below),
few would want to.
Examiners made sweeps of neighborhoods to list “what persons be sick
and of what diseases, and upon doubt, to command restraint of access
until it appear what the disease shall prove.” If you fell ill it
was assumed you had the plague and you were quarantined at home
until it proved otherwise.
Inspecting and verifying works when there are just a few cases. But
when entire streets and neighbourhoods are stricken, few will dare
go there.
Quarantine the Sick and Anyone or Anything in Contact with the
Illness
The rules were first promulgated by James I during an outbreak in
1603: “Anyone found to be sick with the plague is to be shut up in
the same house, and the house is to be quarantined for a month,”
marked prominently and placed under watch day and night so no one
leaves or enters.
Officials charged with visiting, examining, or nursing the sick, or
with carrying away the dead, were ordered not to engage in any
‘social’ contacts. They had to carry signs warning others to keep
clear [like a leper’s proverbial ten-foot pole with a bell on it.]
Sickroom beddings and apparel had to be fumigated or burned. Nothing
could be removed from infected houses. The entire trade in second
hand clothing and goods was shut down.
But when the plague spread the law became meaningless. Those under
house arrest in close quarters with the plague knew they would die
miserably if they stayed; so many tried desperately to escape. Those
charged with standing guard had an incentive to accept hefty bribes
to look the other way, or to desert (because duty and death marched
together).
Plays, bear-baiting, games, singing, ballads, such-like causes of
assemblies of people, and public feastings were banned. There was a
curfew on taverns, ale-houses, and coffee-houses. Few ships ventured
in and none were allowed to leave.
Have Enough Hospitals, Staff, Supplies, and Transportation ready
Before “It” Happens
To be shut in at home with the plague meant death. Being treated at
one of the two hospitals meant a chance of recovery. More hospitals
and more physicians and nurses to staff them would have
significantly reduced the mortality rate, would have provided a much
more effective quarantine of the sick, and the general population
would have been better protected [as was the case in Toronto during
the SARS outbreak.]
The system could cope with small numbers of victims but could not
handle the scale of the emergency: an epidemic can overwhelm
resources and facilities -- more so if the infection runs its course
through a victim in a matter of hours or just a few days..
At the start, there were many courageous doctors and nurses who
valiantly did what they could, but they caught the infection and
died: so by the time the epidemic reached its peak, the resources
available to fight it had been reduced to a minimum.
Dispose of the Dead
The numbers to be buried at the peak (10,000 a week) almost
overwhelmed the authorities. Only the most desperate and destitute,
(and a few saintly souls), could be persuaded to take on the task of
collecting and burying the dead (and the near-dead!). But “not
withstanding the great numbers of dying and sick, the bodies were
always cleared away and carried off every night, so it was never to
be said of London that the living were not able to bury the dead.”
Prevent Crime
Greed, desperation, and an attitude that anything goes, led to
break-ins of houses from which all the residents had been carried
out dead. Some even stole the clothes and boots from the corpses of
plague victims.
Do what is Necessary
Hippocrates said: “Desperate Circumstances may need Desperate
[Creative] Responses.”
Chronicle of a Bio-Attack: London
1664-65 [from a 2001 column]
Introduction
Daniel Defoe was 5 during the 1664-65 London Plague. He wrote his
‘Journal’ (available as a Dover Thrift Edition reprint 2001) in
1722, drawing upon parish records, civic documents, and the memories
of the living.
The Plague epidemic started slowly in September 1664, peaked
terribly in the summer and fall of 1665 and then suddenly faded out.
Official records suggest that one in four died. The true proportion
was much greater: many people left town at the first hint of
trouble.
Defoe describes a society caught up in a nightmare: not knowing what
to do or where to turn. His “Journal” is presented haphazard. There
are no chapter or section headings. It starts, moves on more or less
chronologically, and ends. He repeats himself and is not always
consistent. But he offers insights that could serve us well today.
I have reorganized and compressed his material: my apologies to his
Shade, but I hope I have been true to his purpose.
London, 1665
London at the time of the Plague was by no means in the dark ages.
It had a population of close to 500,000. It was an age of
exploration and discovery. Science had become ‘popular.’ The Royal
Society had recently been founded. Many scientists were also
physicians: Gilbert (magnetism) and Harvey (anatomy) of particular
note. Other illustrious names of the time: Newton, Hooke, Halley,
and Boyle.
There were many more: it wasn’t unusual to find a group of them
drinking together at say one of the better known coffee houses and
talking about navigation, the structure of the universe, the state
of naval architecture, and just about anything else. But when the
plague came, what they knew was not enough.
Limited Early Warning
There were no newspapers, wire services, or TV journalists in 1664
“to spread rumors and reports of things, and to ‘improve’ on them.”
The word came from abroad by letter from one merchant to another,
and locally by word of mouth. This took time.
“But it seems the Government had a true account (of what was
happening abroad) and several councils were held about ways to
prevent its coming over; but all was kept very private.”
Description of Symptoms
There are three forms of Plague: bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic.
From Defoe’s descriptions, it appears the 1664-65 epidemic included
bubonic and septicemic, and possibly pneumonic as well.
“The plague operated in a different manner on differing
constitutions: some were immediately overwhelmed with it, and it
came to violent fevers, vomitings, insufferable headaches, pains in
the back, and on up to ravings and ragings with those pains, dying
in dreadful manner.”
The Bubonic
“Others with swellings and tumors in the neck or groin or armpits …
The swellings when they grew hard and would not break, grew so
painful that it was equal to the most exquisite torture; and some,
not able to bear the torment threw themselves out of windows or shot
themselves. Others, vented their pain by such loud and lamentable
cries to be heard as we walked along the streets that would pierce
the very heart to think of, especially when it was to be considered
that the same dreadful scourge might be expected every moment to
seize upon ourselves.” “These were the worst visited, yet they
frequently recovered, especially if the swellings could be brought
to a head, and to break and run.”
Septicemic?
“Others, who did not develop these swellings died suddenly” “nor
could physicians know certainly how it was with them till they
(autopsied) them.” “Many that had the plague upon them knew nothing
till the inward gangrene had affected their vitals, and they died in
a few moments. This caused that many died in that manner in the
streets suddenly, without warning.”
“Many persons never perceived they were infected until perhaps
several days later, the ‘tokens’ came out on them: mortified or
gangrened flesh in small knobs as broad as a little silver penny and
hard as a piece of callus or horn. At that point they were beyond
curing.”
THE FIRST CASES
Version One
“The first death occurred around Dec 20, 1664 in or about Long Acre;
whence the first person that had the infection was generally said to
(have caught it) from a parcel of silk imported from Holland, and
first opened in that house. But after this, we heard no more of the
plague until the 9th of February 1665 and then one more was buried
out of the same house.”
Version Two
At the end of November 1664, two visitors from France died of the
plague. The families tried to conceal the cause of death (fearing
reactions of neighbors) but word spread. The authorities sent “two
physicians and a surgeon” to inspect the house and they reported it
was the plague. This was printed up in the weekly “Bill of
Mortality” by the parish clerk, in the “usual manner: Plague: 2.
Parishes infected: 1.”
In December, a third man died of plague in the same house. People
all over town grew nervous. But there were no further deaths for six
weeks, and everyone assumed it had been an isolated occurrence.
But on the 12th of February 1665, a fourth man died -- this time in
another house but in the same parish. The weekly mortality reports
began to show increases beyond the norm, and rumors spread that
there had been many more cases of plague than the authorities were
admitting. But the numbers, though on the increase, were still low,
and confined to one part of town.
Lack of Trend, at first
“It is true it was a very cold winter and a long frost which
continued three months, and perhaps the disease was’ frozen up.’ But
the principal recess of this infection was from February to April --
after the frost had broken and the weather mild and warm.” “The
numbers waxed, but then waned; and people were eager to assume all
was well.”
The weather turned warmer, and there were reports of deaths from two
other parishes -- yet the total deaths were but 54 for the whole
city, and when in the next week the numbers dropped, there was a
collective sigh of relief that the worst was over.
Then it became evident that the plague had in fact spread “beyond
all hopes of abatement.” The official numbers were too obviously
fabricated: the true death toll was many times higher than was
reported, and everyone knew this.
“Perhaps it was that the disease was there, but in small numbers,
and households could better conceal the truth about cause of death
from the official rolls -- until the numbers grew so high that no
concealment was possible.”
It was a hot summer, and “the infection spread in a dreadful
manner…the bills rose high; the articles of the fever, spotted
fever, and teeth began to swell.”
By mid-July, the plague was progressing through the town. It kept
mainly to the more crowded, poorer, sections, but perceptibly, was
moving on the more affluent.
“The question is this: Where lay the seeds of the infection all this
while? How came it to stop so long, and not stop any longer?”
DEFENSIVE MEASURES
Concealment
All that could conceal their illness did so: “to prevent their
neighbors cutting them off, and also to prevent the authorities from
sealing their homes: this was not yet practiced, but was threatened,
and people were terrified at the thought of being sealed in and
isolated to die.”
Flight
The wealthier people removed themselves from town in large numbers.
“For some weeks that there was no getting at the Lord Mayor’s door
without exceeding difficulty: to get passes and certificates of
health, for without these there was no way to being admitted to pass
through the towns upon the road, or to lodge in any inn.”
This exodus continued through May and June, spurred by rumor that
the Government was about to establish barricades on the roads to
prevent people from London passing -- for fear they would bring the
infection with them. It was not a good time to fall ill; if you
complained, it was assumed you had the plague.
“It was thought that there were not less than 10,000 houses
abandoned by their occupants, besides the numbers of lodgers and
particular members who were fled out of other families, so that in
all it was computed that about 200,000 people were fled and gone.”
Some (who left later on) “perished in the street or fields for mere
want, or dropped down by the raging violence of the fever upon them.
Others wandered into the country, and went forward any way, as their
desperation guided them, till not getting any relief, the houses and
villages on the road refusing to admit them whether infected or no,
they perished by the roadside or in barns -- none daring to come to
them or to relieve them, though perhaps not infected, for no one
would believe them.”
Many of the poor -- being destroyed not only by the infection but as
much by the consequences of it (lack of employment) -- in
desperation, fled the city, but only found death on the road; “and
they served for no better than the messengers of death, for some
carried the infection with them into the country.”
The country folk did what they could: carrying out food and placing
it at a distance. When the wanderers died, the country folk would
dig a hole at a distance from them to windward, and then, with long
poles and hooks, drag the bodies into these pits and cover them.
Those that so died, and others unknown, are not included in the
statistics.
“The face of London was now strangely altered. Sorrow and sadness
sat upon every face. Everyone looked on himself and his family as in
the utmost danger. The shrieks of women and children at the windows
and doors of their houses, where their dearest relations were
perhaps dying, or just dead, were so frequent to be heard as we
passed the streets.”
Portents and Superstitions
A comet appeared several months before the plague came, and another
just before ‘The Fire’ (1666). In hindsight, “these things had a
more than ordinary influence upon the minds of the common people.”
Prophecies, astrological conjurations, dreams, and old wives’ tales
took hold. Would-be preachers ran through the streets with
apocalyptic shouts and further alarmed the populace.” There were
instances of crowds caught up in “mysterious visions.”
“This folly presently made the town swarm with a wicked generation
of pretenders. Purveyors of nostrums had a field day: ‘Infallible
preventive pills against the plague’; ‘Sovereign cordials against
the corruption of the air’ ‘Anti-pestilential pills’.” [We in our
day are also bombarded with such claims].
Supposedly eminent healers from abroad [the gurus and miracle
workers always hail from far away] set up shop and touted their
prowess: “newly come over from where he resided during all the time
of the great plague last year, and cured multitudes of people.”
“But there was still another madness beyond all this, which may
serve to give an idea of the distracted humor of the poor people at
that time: in wearing charms, philters, exorcisms, amulets, and I
know not what preparations, to fortify against the plague…that it
was to be kept off with crossings, signs of the zodiac, papers tied
up with so many knots, and certain words or figures written on them,
as particularly the word Abracadabra, formed in triangle or
pyramid.”
But these charms did not help, and all too many poor souls were
“carried away in the dead carts and thrown into the common graves of
every parish with these hellish charms and trumpery hanging about
their necks.”
By the end, all the predictors, astrologers, fortune-tellers, and
what they called cunning-men, conjurers and the like “were gone and
vanished: not one of them was to be found. Many went to their long
home, not able to foretell their own fate.”
Who to Turn To in Extremity?
As the plague spread, the populace gave up their trust in the
quacks, but then, not knowing what to do, or who to turn to, they
ran frantically around: calling on God, and asking one another “What
shall we do?”
Many “turned to prayers, fasting, and ‘humiliation’, and imploring
the mercy of God. But “neither can I acquit those ministers that in
their sermons rather sank than lifted up the hearts of their
hearers.”
With imminent death looming, many, especially the dying, repented of
past actions. “But none durst come near to comfort them.” “Some of
the ministers did visit the sick at first, but it would have been
present death to have gone into some houses. The very buriers of the
dead, who were the hardenest creatures in town, were sometimes so
terrified that they durst not go into houses where the whole
families were swept away together -- but time inured them to it
all.”
Actions by the Authorities
“At the start, the Lord Mayor and the sheriffs, the Court of
Aldermen, and a certain number of the Common Council men, or their
deputies, came to a certain resolution, and published it: that they
would not quit the city themselves, but that they would be always at
hand for the preserving good order in every place, as also for the
distributing the public charity: for doing the duty and discharging
the trust reposed in them by the citizens to the utmost of their
power. And they were in fact continually in the streets and at
places of the greatest danger. [We have witnessed similar courage
and leadership, by many in our own time; and ‘sauve qui peut’
cowardice from a few].
The finances of the City were in good shape, and used generously to
sustain the poor. (many were unemployed now because Trade was
‘stopped’, and also, the city was largely depopulated or closed up).
Few ships ventured up the river, and none were allowed to leave.
Every family retrenched their living as much as possible. The Royal
Court contributed considerably (but kept their physical distance).
Many of the wealthy who had left town gave generously for relief of
the poor.
Bread and Provisioning
Thanks to the authorities, even at the height of the epidemic,
provisions were always to be had in full plenty, and the prices not
raised much.
“Neither was there any want of bakers or ovens kept open to supply
the people. The Master of the Bakers’ Company, was, with his court
of assistants, directed to see the orders of my Lord Mayor for their
regulation put in execution: the due assize of weekly bread
observed; all the bakers obliged to keep their oven going
constantly.”
Pest-Houses
There were only two ‘pest-houses’ to house the sick. “If there had
been, and if a person, as soon as he fell sick, could have been
removed there, the number of fatalities would have been greatly
reduced.” “Very good physicians were appointed, so that many people
did in fact come out of them well again: in all the time of the
visitation, there were but 300 buried from the two houses, in
total.”
The lack of hospitals meant shutting up the well with the sick at
home. This was a powerful inducement for the others to escape -- to
further transmit the sickness.
Quarantines
There was a necessity in this extremity to look to law and order,
and it was done.
Starting in June, the authorities established emergency regulations.
Houses in some parishes were “shut up” -- guarding against entry or
exit. The dead were taken and buried immediately. The plague ceased
in those streets: early vigilance is an essential weapon in the
struggle.
This shutting up of people in their own houses was first used in the
London plague of 1603 under “An Act for the charitable Relief and
Ordering of Persons infected with the Plague.” Anyone found to be
sick with the plague was to be immediately sequestered in the same
house, and even if he recovered, “the house shall remain shut up for
a month.”
*To quarantine the infection, “the sickroom beddings and apparel,
etc. must be well aired with fire and “such perfumes as are
requisite within the infected house.”
*Any person who visits a person known to be infected or who entered
willingly into a known infected house, “his house too is to be shut
up.”
*No one can be removed from the house where he fell sick except to
the “pest-house or a tent” or to a house where the owner/occupier
accepts full responsibility. If a person owns two houses, he may
send either his sound or his infected people to the second house:
the second house also being shut up then for a week, in case of
undetected cases.
*Every house visited by the plague is to be marked with a large red
cross.
*Searchers, Chirurgeons, Keepers, and Buriers are to hold a red rod
of three feet in length, open and evident; they are to abstain from
company, and must not enter any home except their own or to where
they are officially sent.
*Hackney-Coachmen [Taxis] must air their coach and place it in
quarantine for 5 days after carrying an infected person.
The shutting up of houses was at first looked on as very cruel and
‘unchristian.’ “But it was a public good that justified the private
mischief.” “But it was not to be depended on. It served to make
those confined desperate, and they resorted to extremities,
including assault upon the watch, and even murder to break out.”
From those shut up “we heard the most dismal shrieks and outcries of
the poor people, terrified by the sight of the condition of their
dearest, and by the terror of being imprisoned as they were.” For,
if one member of a household fell ill with the plague, and the rest
of the household were ‘shut up’ with the sick person, it was almost
certain that all would die. Some are on record as actually dying of
fright; many were traumatized to the point of going mad; and some
lost their memory of those events.
Self-Quarantine
On the other hand, many families, warned that the plague was coming,
put up provisions and shut themselves in; not being seen or heard of
until the epidemic was over: “keeping their houses like little
garrisons: suffering none to go in or come near them.”
In the beginning of August, the plague grew ‘very violent’, and ‘my
doctor friend’ coming to visit me, and finding that I ventured so
often out into the streets, earnestly persuaded me to lock myself up
and my family; to keep all our windows fast; shutters and curtains
close; and never to open them.”
“People walked in the middle of the street, so they would not mingle
with anyone that came out of houses, or meet with smells and scent
from houses that might be infected.”
Inspections
The master of any house, as soon as anyone in his household
complained of “blotch or purple or swelling in any part of the body
or who fell dangerously sick “without apparent cause of some other
disease,” had to notify the Examiner of Health within two hours.
Examiners made sweeps of neighborhoods to list “what persons be
sick, and of what diseases, and upon doubt, to command restraint of
access until it appear what the disease shall prove.” Every infected
house was to be under watch day and night.
Women Searchers, “of the highest and most honest repute”, were
appointed to inspect the dead to make sure of cause of death. “No
Searcher during this time of visitation was permitted to use any
public work or employment, or keep any shop or stall, or be employed
in any common employment whatsoever.”
Any “Nurse-Keeper” who removed herself out of an infected house
before 28 days after the decease of any person dying of the
infection, both she and the house to which she removed herself was
also quarantined for a further 28 days.
Disposal of the Dead
Thanks to the authorities, even at the height of the epidemic, no
dead bodies lay unburied or uncovered: *The dead are to be buried
before sunrise or after sunset. No neighbors or friends are allowed
to attend. *No corpse dead of infection is to be buried or remain in
any church at a time of common prayer etc. (where others are present
for services). *Children are not allowed to come near the corpse,
coffin, or grave.
*All graves are to be at least six feet deep. “They dug several
great and deep pits into which they put 50 bodies each; then they
made larger holes wherein they buried all that the dead-carts (in
that parish) brought in a week.” At the beginning of September the
numbers of bodies to be disposed of was increasing: “people that
were infected and near their end, and delirious also, would run to
those pits, wrapt in blankets or rugs, and throw themselves in, and
expired there.” (At the height of the epidemic, the numbers to be
buried across the city ran to 10,000 a week, concentrated in a few
parishes!)
There were problems excavating large and deeper pits: the water
table was encountered at twenty feet depth.
Sanitation
[These regulations are all sensible; more so in a time when they had
no clear idea of what the Plague was, or how it was spread].
*No clothes, stuff, bedding, or garments can be removed from
infected houses. (Dealers and trade in second hand clothing and
goods were ordered closed down). Some turned to fumigation and fire
to purge infected houses and goods: burning brimstone, sulfur,
pitch, and even gunpowder!
In 1666, the Great Fire did indeed destroy remaining traces of
infection in much of the City. But not in all. Defoe asks: “How has
it been that the plague has not come back in all those great
parishes where the fire never came, and where the plague raged with
the greatest violence?”
*The streets are to be swept clean: every householder must do so
daily before his door. *The sweepings and filth of houses is to be
carried away daily.
*No poor quality produce or fish or meats is to be sold. Breweries
and drinking establishments are to be inspected for “musty and
unwholesome casks.”
*No hogs, dogs, cats, tame pigeons, or conies, are to be kept in any
part of the city (see below under “How the Plague was Spread”).
Restraints on Public Gatherings and Converse
*No wandering beggars. *“No plays, bear-baitings, games, singing of
ballads, or such-like causes of assemblies of people. No public
feasting till further order. *A Curfew on taverns, ale-houses, and
coffee-houses.
THE EPIDEMIC RAGES
The Medical Profession
Physicians were appointed “for relief of the poor.” The College of
Physicians was asked to publish recipes for cheap and effective
remedies: this helped at least to turn the populace away from the
quacks, their nostrums, and the use of outright poisons.
But “the violence of the distemper, when it came to its extremity,
was like the fire the next year. The fire, which consumed what the
plague could not touch, defied all the application of remedies; the
fire-engines were broken, the buckets thrown away, and the power of
man was baffled and brought to an end. So the plague defied all
medicines, the very physicians were seized with it, with their
preservatives in their mouths, and men went about prescribing to
others and telling them what to do till the tokens were upon them,
and they dropped down dead. Many of the most eminent died of the
infection.
Abundance of quacks too died, who had the folly to trust to their
own medicines.”
“Not that it is any derogation from the labor or application of the
physicians to say they fell in the common calamity; it is rather to
their praise that they ventured their lives so far in the service of
others. Doubtless they helped many by their skill, and their
prudence. But they could not cure those that had the tokens upon
them, or who were mortally infected before the physicians were sent
for.”
How the Plague was Spread
There were many theories about how the plague was spread. The more
enlightened assumed an ‘infection’ transmitted by some unknown
agency -- possibly airborne. Others considered it a punishment from
Heaven and therefore without agency.
“The plague is carried from house to house in the clothes.” It first
broke out in a house where goods from the Levant by way of Holland
had been carried. It spread from there carried by those made sick to
those with whom they had conversation.
“The best physic against the plague is to run away from it.”
“Consider separating the people into smaller bodies, and removing
them (before the plague comes) farther from one another, and let not
such a contagion as this, which is indeed chiefly dangerous to
collected bodies of people, find a million of people in a body
together. The plague, like a great fire, if a few houses only are
contiguous where it happens, can only burn a few houses. But if it
begins in a close-built town or city, and gets a head, there its
fury increases; it rages over the whole place, and consumes all it
can reach.”
Infection generally came into a house because members of the
household went out to shop -- for food and other necessaries, and in
so doing, came into proximity with others on the street and in
shops, etc.
“Nothing was more fatal to the inhabitants of the city than the
supine negligence of the people themselves, who, during the long
notice of warning, made no provision for it by laying in store of
provisions, or of other necessaries, by means of which they might
have lived retired and within their own houses: those who did were
in great measure preserved by that caution.”
“However, the poor could not lay up provisions, and must go to
market to buy; this brought abundance of ‘unsound’ people to the
markets, and a great many went thither sound brought death home with
them.”
At the height of the plague, The Lord Mayor caused country people
who brought provisions to sell in the city to be stopped at the
outskirts (in informal markets) where they sold what they brought
and then went away. This precaution encouraged country folk to bring
the food to the city that the people needed.
“We were ordered to kill all the dogs and cats; for they are apt to
run from house to house and from street to street, and are capable
of carrying the infection in their fur. All possible endeavors were
used also to destroy the mice and rats -- especially the latter, by
laying poisons for them, and a prodigious multitude of them were
destroyed.”
Crime
There were many robberies and “wicked practices”. “The power of
avarice was so strong in some that they would run any hazard to
steal and to plunder, and particularly in houses where all the
inhabitants have been dead and carried out, and without regard to
infection take even the clothes off the dead bodies and the
bed-clothes.”
At the Height of the Plague
From the middle of August to the middle of October, the official
records show thirty to forty thousand died of plague. Another ten
thousand were recorded as dying of other causes -- but most of those
were probably due to one or other form of plague, or its
consequences.
But it was impossible to know the real totals: clerks,
administrators, and those on the ‘front line’ were overwrought
simply trying to gather and bury the dead. The true toll probably
reached two thousand a day at the height. There were likely at least
100,000 victims of the plague in 1665 alone. “There was not a town
within ten or twenty miles of the City but that was more or less
infected.”
“Whole families and indeed whole streets of families, were swept
away together. It was frequent for neighbors to call to the bellman
to go to such-and-such houses, and fetch out the people, for that
they were all dead. By then, the work of removing the dead bodies
had grown extremely dangerous; innumerable of the bearers died of
the infection. Yet there was such need of employment that others of
the poor were always ready to take on the work. So, not withstanding
the great numbers dying and sick, the bodies were always cleared
away and carried off every night, so it was never to be said of
London that the living were not able to bury the dead.”
With those died, and those who had left town, there were not
one-third as many people in town during August and September as
there had been in January and February.
“After funerals became so many that people could not toll the bell,
mourn or weep, or wear black for one another; nor so much as make
coffins for those who died; so after the fury of the infection
appeared to be so increased, in short, they shut up no houses at
all. It seemed enough that all the remedies had been used until they
were found fruitless.”
“People began to give themselves up to their fears and to think that
all regulations and methods were in vain. I do not mean a religious
despair, or a despair of their eternal state, but I mean a despair
of their being able to escape the infection or to outlive the
plague, which they saw was so raging and so irresistible in its
force.”
“People in this despair turned bold and venturous: they were no more
shy of each other, or restrained indoors, but went anywhere and
everywhere, and began to converse: ‘tis no matter who is all sick or
who is sound.’ As it brought people into public company, so it
brought them in large numbers into the churches. ‘A near view of
death soon reconciles men of good will to one another, and bring us
to see with differing eyes than those with which we looked on things
with before.’ But as the terror abated, those things all returned
again to their less desirable state.”
THE END OF THE EPIDEMIC
“It was even at the height of this general despair that the plague
began to slacken, surprisingly, even as it had come.”
In September, the plague abated in the west and north-west parishes
(so dreadfully visited at the first), but raged elsewhere in the
city through the beginning of October. Then, as October wore on, the
plague diminished both in numbers infected and in its intensity so
that the proportion of deaths among those infected dropped. People
grew careless, and for a time the numbers increased again. But the
contagion was ‘exhausted,’ and winter weather came: the air was cold
and clear, with sharp frosts. Most of those fallen sick recovered.
Not withstanding the violence of the plague in London, it was never
on board the fleet.
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Editor's notes: I thought
it would be useful to group all of David Newman's Big Med musings on
pandemics on one 'page.' He will be sending along other thoughts on
this topic.
If you've got
questions/suggestions for David Newman, please send them to
ideas@tems.ca
Pandemic Revisited
[Sep 6 07]
Danger Pay [Aug 27
07]
Ethics and Triage: A Nasty Scenario
[Dec 12 06]
Pandemic Flu Planning: "A Flow is a
Quantification of Assumptions" [Dec 6 06]
The London Plague of 1664-65: Summary
[from 2006]
Chronicle of a Bio-Attack: London
1664-65 [from 2001]
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